



DEPAUL UNIVERSITY

College of Law

TORTS CLASS SIMULATION

Vosburg v. Putney

Professor of Law Bruce L. Ottley

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As you read this case, please ask yourself the following questions:

- **What were the facts in the case?**
- **Assume you are the 14 year-old plaintiff. What was the basis of your claim that the cost of his injury should be shifted to the defendant?**
- **Assume you are the 11 year-old defendant. What argument would you raise that the cost of the injury should lie with the plaintiff?**
- **What did the jury find regarding the defendant's intention in kicking the plaintiff?**
- **How did the Wisconsin Court treat the jury's finding of the defendant's lack of intent to cause harm?**

Supreme Court of Wisconsin

VOSBURG

v.

PUTNEY.

Nov. 17, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Waukesha county; A. SCOTT SLOAN, Judge. Reversed.

Action by Andrew Vosburg against George Putney for personal injuries. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

The action was brought to recover damages for an assault and battery, alleged to have been committed by the defendant upon the plaintiff on February 20, 1889. The answer is a general denial. At the date of the alleged assault the plaintiff was a little more than 14 years of age, and the defendant a little less than 12 years of age.

The injury complained of was caused by a kick inflicted by defendant upon the leg of the plaintiff, a little below the knee. The transaction occurred in a school-room in Waukesha, during school hours, both parties being pupils in the school. A former trial of the cause resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for \$2,800. The defendant appealed from such judgment to this court, and the same was reversed for error, and a new trial awarded.

78 Wis. 84, 47 N. W. Rep. 99. The case has been again tried in the circuit court, and the trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff for \$2,500. The facts of the case, as they appeared on both trials, are sufficiently stated in the opinion by Mr. Justice ORTON on the former appeal, and require no repetition. On the last trial the jury found a special verdict, as follows: "(1) Had the plaintiff during the month of January, 1889, received an injury just above the knee, which became inflamed, and produced pus?

Answer. Yes. (2) Had such injury on the 20th day of February, 1889, nearly healed at the point of the injury? A. Yes. (3) Was the plaintiff, before said 20th of February, lame, as the result of such injury? A. No. (4) Had the tibia in the plaintiff's right leg become inflamed or diseased to some extent before he received the blow or kick from the defendant? A. No. (5) What was the exciting cause of the injury to the plaintiff's leg? A. Kick. (6) Did the defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, intend to do him any harm? A. No. (7) At what sum do you assess the damages of the plaintiff? A. Twenty-five hundred dollars." The defendant moved for judgment in his favor on the verdict, and also for a new trial. The plaintiff moved for judgment on the verdict in his favor. The motions of defendant were overruled, and that of the plaintiff granted. Thereupon judgment for plaintiff, for \$2,500 damages and costs of suit, was duly entered. The defendant appeals from the judgment.

LYON, J., (after stating the facts.)

Several errors are assigned, only three of which will be considered.

The jury having found that the defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, did not intend to do him any harm, counsel for defendant maintain that the plaintiff has no cause of action, and that defendant's motion for judgment on the special verdict should have been granted. In support of this proposition counsel quote from 2 Greenl. Ev. <section> 83, the rule that "the intention to do harm is of the essence of an assault." Such is the rule, no doubt, in actions or prosecutions for mere assaults. But this is an action to recover damages for an alleged assault and battery. In such case the rule is correctly stated, in many of the authorities cited by counsel, that plaintiff must show either that the intention was unlawful, or that the defendant is in fault. If the intended act is unlawful, the intention to commit it must necessarily be unlawful. Hence, as applied to this case, if the kicking of the plaintiff by the defendant was an unlawful act, the intention of defendant to kick him was also unlawful.

Had the parties been upon the play-grounds of the school, engaged in the usual boyish sports, the defendant being free from malice, wantonness, or negligence, and intending no harm to plaintiff in what he did, we should hesitate to hold the act of the defendant unlawful, or that he could be held liable in this action. Some consideration is due to the implied license of the play-grounds. But it appears that the injury was inflicted in the school, after it had been called to order by the teacher, and after the regular exercises of the school had commenced. Under these circumstances, no implied license to do the act complained of existed, and such act was a violation of the order and decorum of the school, and necessarily unlawful. Hence we are of the opinion that, under the evidence and verdict, the action may be sustained.

Certain questions were proposed on behalf of defendant to be submitted to the jury, founded upon the theory that only such damages could be recovered as the defendant might reasonably be supposed to have contemplated as likely to result from his kicking the plaintiff. The court refused to submit such questions to the jury. The ruling was correct. The rule of damages in actions for torts was held in *Brown v. Railway Co.*, 54 Wis. 342, 11 N. W. Rep. 356, 911, to be that the wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him. The chief justice and the writer of this opinion dissented from the judgment in that case, chiefly because we were of the opinion that the complaint stated a cause of action *ex contractu*, and not *ex delicto*, and hence that a different rule of damages--the rule here contended for-- was applicable. We did not question that the rule in actions for tort was correctly stated. That case rules this on the question of damages.

The remaining errors assigned are upon the rulings of the court on objections to testimony. These rulings are not very likely to be repeated on another trial, and are not of sufficient importance to require a review of them on this appeal. The judgment of the circuit court must be reversed, and the cause will be remanded for a new trial.