



INTERRUPTED SILENCE

ACTIVELY ENGAGED INTELLECTUALS, INTELLECTUALLY
ENGAGED ACTIVISTS

COMPILED AND PUBLISHED
SPRING QUARTER 2023

HIGHLIGHTED EVENTS

"Greenwashing Nuclear Energy"
Colloquium with Professors Kelly
Tzoumis and Henry Fowler

International Studies Alumni
Panel

"Zan, Zendegi, Azadi (Woman,
Life, Freedom)" Colloquium with
Professor Armaghan Ziaee

"A Letter to Baba" Talk by
Professor Shiera Malik

INTuesdays Led by Student
Representatives

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Image via mindtheg.com

A Warm Welcome

The end of this academic year is nearing, and both the weather and countless final projects are inescapable reminders of the break that is soon to come! The INT Department is hosting its final events for the year, where we gather to eat and have fun. These occasions serve as short yet comforting breaks from the many commitments that suddenly feel unmanageable at this time of the year. Yet each Spring, we do what must be done (as DePaul's motto emphasizes) and return in the Autumn to do it all again. To those who will not be returning, congratulations on every achievement you hold to your name, and best of luck on your endeavors to collect more.

This would not be a proper *INTerrupted Silence* introduction, however, without the mention of what is happening internationally. Protests have continued, ended, or just started around the world. Climate crises have intensified. Many of the concepts and issues we analyze, discuss, and attempt to solve in our INT classes perpetuate in the real world. Our professors present us with the tools necessary to critically analyze these events, what they mean to us as individuals, and how they impact the world as a whole. This edition of *INTerrupted Silence* features analyses of Syria and Myanmar, questions about women in Iran, critiques of historical peace negotiations, and more. International Studies grants us the courage to challenge the powers that permit global issues to continue, which is exactly what so many of our students do.

On a lighter note, the pandemic has finally been declared over by the UN World Health Organization and we have slowly transitioned back into classrooms and in-person events. The anticipation of summer usually pulls us closer to friends and family and away from the annual recluse of Chicago winters. In these gatherings, we must realize the importance of togetherness both for our own joy as well as for the future of the world. The International Studies Department aims to bring its students together to maintain a sense of community in such a fast-paced world, so be sure to keep an eye out for the many INTuesday events and conferences that we offer year-round by following our socials! Finally, I'd like to include a particularly important quote by Audre Lorde from her famous publication, *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches*, where she warns that "without community, there is no liberation."

With that, thank you to the International Studies Department faculty, staff, and students for making such a gratifying year of change. I hope you enjoy this quarter's newsletter which reflects the power of each student's voice to actively engage in the world and attempt to better it.

-Sara Aqariden

INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR KAVEH EHSANI: ON THE IRANIAN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

What forms of oppression are women in Iran facing today?

There are two things: one is the Islamic Republic symbolically controlling the body of women which creates a symbolic centerpiece of illegitimacy. Since the revolution, women have made huge steps forward. There is a majority of university students and graduates who are women and even though there is a lot of inequality, they have massively entered the workforce in all fields. There is a paradox there, in state discourse that attempts to control the institutions of marriage and women's bodies in public, as well as to create a modern Islamic society. In terms of the position of women, you have the unequal state laws and then you have the patriarchy at home. This patriarchy is a different field that women, especially the feminist movement in Iran, have begun to engage very seriously since the revolution. There has been a questioning of the patriarchal figure as the father figure and husband on a state level. The focus of the current protests is against the state, but the feminist movement focuses on the patriarchal structures in the family that occur in the private domain.

How do these "protests" against patriarchy within the home appear?

This is a bit complex but is fascinating. First of all, the issue of the hijab: the protests in Iran are not just about the hijab and women. Its national question is injustices in the provinces-- there is a lot of discontent that is coalesced. In large cities and especially among the secular middle classes, the issue of the hijab is most visible and has captured a lot of international attention, but there are other issues that are just as important and interlinked. Although the protests started against state violence, the killing of Mahsa Amini by Iranian police ignited protests on a nationwide level.

Before that, if women pushed the boundary and questioned the hijab to try to gain autonomy, a lot of them felt hostility from within their own households or from men on the street. So, if they took their hijab down and risked going out in public, they were harassed and treated in a negative way.

Since this movement started, I think there's been a shockwave within the family structures in many places. Many women who have been interviewed say that in public, they are supported by men because suddenly this injustice has become part of social consciousness and women's courage in resisting the state and risking violence. It has galvanized the public, including men. Within their families, many feel there is a questioning of patriarchy. Many also say they are afraid to bring it up because there will be consequences, so many of these women in interviews say that "if I risk

ON THE IRANIAN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

taking my scarf down, my father will reject my place at home but I have to live at home because the economy is so bad I can't get housing elsewhere." So there is a huge risk, material as well as individual, in questioning the patriarchy. I think there has been a big shock to patriarchal systems at home as well as in public so that is a step forward but there is a long way to go.

Would it be a correct judgement to say that the Islamic Republic in Iran has transformed men into "household police" to execute the state's desires in maintaining control?

This was very much the case in 1978 during the revolution and the immediate years after where this type of piety and ideological commitment to Khamenei's version of Islam was very much at the forefront. Within families where people were pro-regime versus anti-religious and theocratic versions of it, there was a lot of division. Many families broke apart from these divisions, but after the war and from the 1990s onwards, it became very clear who was pro-regime, reformist, or anti-regime. Ultimately among those against the regime, there is a spectrum of discontent. These divisions occurring within families at this point decreased. In 2009 there was a huge movement against the elections that brought a wave of mass repression. A lot of conservative generals or hardcore supporters of the regime, for example, had children who were at the core of the protests. That was a moment when within the pro-regime families, it became clear that the young generation was against this system. The response of the regime after 2009 was to isolate and put its supporters in enclaves so as not to be "contaminated" by the rest of society. But by and large, it is very clear now after the revolution who stands where. The younger generation of hardcore regime supporters is breaking away, you don't see new people becoming supporters of the regime. There is nothing in it for them.

What would you recommend to strengthen the Iranian Women's Movement and humanitarian demands in general?

What is required, at least for democratic change, is to organize from the grassroots up. Street protests are really important but they don't change society, and if they do, it's unclear where they can go. You can get chaos and in chaos, mafias can come up. Or you can get a national breakdown - separatism, civil war, and awful things can happen. What you need in democratic movements, feminist movements, and worker's movements, is to build from the grassroots up. Ask, "What type of alternative society do we want?" so that people feel vested in this and support it. It's hard, but that's what's required. And that might take time, but nonetheless, I think after the first five months when everyone was very hot-headed and thought "Hey, we have a revolution on our hands," now everyone knows that it requires more serious work. I am relatively hopeful that this is the direction we are headed in.

STUDY ABROAD: SPRING BREAK 2024



ENGLAND: CATHEDRALS, A PILGRIMAGE

As with globalization today, medieval pilgrimage involved people bringing ideas, as well as goods and skills, across national borders, irrevocably impacting and being impacted by the communities through which they traveled. Like a pilgrimage, students in this spring break study abroad course will share a collaborative journey of discovery and cultural exchange as they engage with England's rich medieval past and its present day, post-Brexit, present.

Application deadline: 11/01/2023

BELGIUM: IMPACT & INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION & NATO

This graduate program allows students to broaden their perspective on public policy analysis and public service management in an international context. The course explores how globalization is affecting national governments and traditional cultures, while encouraging the creation of international non-profits and supranational governing agencies. Students will learn how large agencies, such as the European Union and NATO, are strengthening relationships and working more closely with grassroots organizations throughout the world.

Application deadline: 11/01/2023



FY@BROAD ECUADOR: BIODIVERSITY & THE MODERN EXTINCTION CRISIS

The study abroad portion takes the class to Ecuador, a small country with extraordinary natural diversity. We will hike through the rainforest, snorkel in the ocean, and participate in cultural activities while observing an astounding variety of wildlife as we explore three very different types of ecosystems. Through this experience, students will see an incredible diversity of natural ecosystems and will interact with local people whose very cultural heritage is being threatened by human development.

Application deadline: 11/01/2023

International Humanitarian Law and the Cases of Syria and Myanmar

AMELIA COCHRAN | NOVEMBER 1, 2022

The Syrian Civil War has raged for the past 11 years, fueling a myriad of claims that International Humanitarian Law has been violated by the government. Though allegations and evidence have steadily seen light from NGOs, Syria and more specifically President Bashir Al Assad are out of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) since Syria is not a signee to the Rome Statute. The legal process commonly taken for convictions of those not party to the statute is through the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreeing to act against the offender. However, in the case of Syria, longtime allies China and Russia vetoed the utilization of the council. Thus, the claims of grave human rights violations have gone unanswered and unprosecuted.

However, a prospective new jurisdictional gateway has become a potential mode of prosecution. The Rohingya people from Myanmar have been facing what has been labeled as ethnic cleansing. The international community has faced a dilemma similar to Syria where evidence and accusations have been produced yet, the state of Myanmar is not a party to the Rome Statute. Regardless, the state has entered Pre-Trial within the ICC due to cleverly crafted jurisdictional loopholes. The ICC does not try states but in this stage will conduct an investigation to try the individuals responsible for the crime of deportation. Bangladesh is a signee of the statute and also happens to be the region in which Rohingya refugees have been displaced. The legal argument is as follows: the court has jurisdiction over a crime as long as one element of it took place in the territory of a state party according to Article 12 of the statute. Thus, if the ICC can conclude that the conduct element of forcible displacement from ethnic villages in Myanmar for Rohingyas had the intended consequence of civilians crossing the international border into Bangladesh, the state could be tried on the crime of deportation. Though the crime itself did not occur in Bangladesh the effects of deportation were manifested there, establishing jurisdiction. The task is therefore proving that not only are the reports consistent and credible as they claim but also that the military junta had the intention of deportation. This route of prosecution entails purely the discovery of if Rohingyas were forcibly

displaced into Bangladesh and does not intend to investigate any crimes outside this scope. If the Myanmar case makes it beyond Pre-Trial and sets a legal precedent, many believe that it can be applied to Syria in order to make convictions. Yet there must be evidence beyond doubt present that verifies the Assad regime intended to forcibly displace Syrians across the border into Jordan and not just displace within the state borders. The case against Myanmar has provided what is interpreted as sufficient proof of the military junta operating with the intention of international border displacement, however, the challenge for the Syria case will be producing this evidence. Rohingya refugees have produced internal military memos, policy papers, official statements, and interviews with former soldiers all corroborating the story of deportation. The Chamber concluded that there was reasonable basis to believe that widespread violence occurred towards the Rohingya population including murder, imprisonment, rape, torture, sexual violence which directly resulted in civilians having to flee into Bangladesh. On the other hand, the claims against the Syrian government deporting civilians are fairly new claims that lack proof. Though Assad clearly displaced peoples, legal precedent states that it must be across the international border. The Rome Statute itself states that it is a crime against humanity to “deport or forcibly transfer a population”. However, the ICC will not prosecute all forms of displacement. In the case of Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, the defendant was found not guilty of the crime of deportation as a crime against humanity. It was determined that forcible movement across de facto borders did not constitute the crime of deportation. This was echoed in the case of Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic and through the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia, where clear distinctions between forced displacement and deportation were drawn. Furthermore, because Syria and Myanmar both remain outside the realm of the Rome Statute, deportation is the only crime that presents possibilities of exercising jurisdiction.

The cases of Myanmar and Syria are close enough to create a legal precedent that has applicability. The case against Myanmar attaches jurisdiction to the bodies of refugees reestablishing what the ICC conditions as jurisdiction. In 2019, UK lawyers, on behalf of their Syrian Refugee clients filed a claim with the ICC to open an investigation on Assad, following the legal pathway set by the Myanmar case. Though these refugees have detailed accounts of the crimes the government has committed, the key to the case will be if any can produce evidence of intentional deportation. The Myanmar case will likely surmise enough evidence to make a conviction. Though they have an alliance with China, the Chinese government has encouraged a ceasefire with ethnic groups in the region. Thus, establishing the government lacks support from their one ally with

sway in the international legal world. The same cannot be said for Syria. As long as Assad remains in power, the chances of a conviction against him are nearly impossible. Assad has strong support from Russia and the general understanding of the international community is that removing Assad from power would work against the tense efforts that have been introduced to end the violence. Moreover, the very act of holding Assad responsible will undermine political compromise, a critique of the international criminal court that has been prevalent since its establishment. The notion of ending 11 years of violence could crumble if the Assad regime feels threatened by the ICC. Thus, even if the Myanmar case sees success, Syria and Al Assad, despite a similar situation and evidence, will likely never see a deportation crime of humanity conviction.

What does this new precedent and jurisdiction mean for international law? States have always been able to opt out of treaties; it is the law of treaties and one of the fundamental definitions of international jurisdiction within the 1969 Vienna Convention. If the Myanmar case breaches the pre-trial stage, becomes legal precedent, and can be applied to Syria, the nature of the international legal process will be permanently changed. Loopholes for jurisdiction could potentially establish a new regime where the treaty of treaties is bypassed, and nations are forced to comply with law they are not signed to. This breach of consent could be a problem for smaller nations not wishing to comply with the international legal norms set by the global West. Ergo, the legal question is if the Rome Statute can assume territorial jurisdiction and the theoretical question is what this will mean for jurisdiction and international law as a whole. This new formulation of the law reorganizes the international community. Giving the ICC power over nations outside the signees takes a largely horizontal form of legal ruling and recreates it into a vertical one.

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
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


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**NOTABLE FILM RECS
(AND THEIR SOUNDTRACKS TO STUDY ALONG TO)**



Identity Matters: A Constructivist Critique of the Dayton Accords

EMMA WENDT | MARCH, 2023

Introduction

At the time the Dayton Peace Accords were signed in 1995, they were seen as a huge success. Namely, the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina stopped, a federalized Bosnian state was achieved, and a semi liberal government was instituted. The United States brokered this peace agreement, and outlined a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia. It must not go unnoticed that the Dayton Accords brought four violent and bloody years to an end; a conflict that resulted in more than 300,000 deaths and more than two million refugees, had finally stopped. Though as the 28th anniversary of the signing of Dayton approaches, more and more criticism of the accords are coming to the forefront. Now that it is so widely criticized, the question arises: what went wrong?

The United States followed a liberal formula for success, which is not inherently “wrong”. America prides itself on an identity of liberalism, in the sense that the US respects the rule of law, human rights, and state boundaries when it comes to foreign policy. Though the American government has long created states in its own image, which is liberalism, though quite imperial in a sense as well. The case of the intervention in Bosnia that led to the Dayton Accords is no different. Coincidentally, 1994/95 is when the idea of “democratic peace” (the theory that because democracies have a low probability of going to war with other democracies, spreading democracy and supporting it should be important in American foreign policy) became part of US foreign policy because of President Bill Clinton. Hence, the US took on a liberal policy of trying to “save” the multinational state of Bosnia.

Within this American practice of liberalism, identity issues often go unnoticed. The Bosnian War was a conflict rooted in identity and ethnic issues and hostilities, so it does not entirely make sense that a liberal strategy was used to solve an identity conflict.

So the question arises, what role (if any) did identity politics play in the American decision to support a multinational Bosnian state (that led to the Dayton Peace Accords which are thought to have failed) rather than a partition plan? I argue, through a constructivist lens, that the US placed an identity onto the Balkan region that they were

historically chaotic and thus projected their own identity and agenda onto a region that was hurt by identity and ethnic differences. Regional knowledge and identity politics of the area did not play enough of a role in the US government's intervention and support of a multinational Bosnian state.

Historical Context

The countries of former Yugoslavia all have long histories of peoples and movements moving through them, which situates the Balkan region in a particularly interesting position politically, culturally, and geographically. Yugoslavia was known for its interethnic stability, and one of the reasons for this was Josip Broz Tito's intentional construction of a system that regulated national conflict between the different ethnic groups and republics. The emphasis on a "Yugoslav" identity heightened during Tito's regime. Following the disintegration and breakup of this multinational state, especially after the death of Tito, the uncertainty made way for ethnic hostilities and friction.

The history, and ultimately the fall, of Yugoslavia has left the people of the Balkan region with complex identities and questioning feelings of belonging. A resurgence of ethnic nationalism intensified throughout the region. This, more often than not, resulted in violent conflict in the region and even ethnic cleansing by majority collectives over minority ethnic groups. A large contributor to this violence were Serbian nationalists, who wanted a centralized Yugoslav state and a tight federalization of the country. Even before the official fall of Yugoslavia, there was an expansion of Serbian control that was headed by president Slobodan Milosevic, an ethnic Serb. Milosevic promoted a system, as Robert Tucker describes, of "reciprocal fears," meaning each group feared they would be dominated by another. Tensions grew especially between Serbs and Bosnians because of Serbian fears of repeated persecution from the World War II era. A Serbian victim complex resurged during Milosevic's presidency.

Though the Bosniaks held the population majority in the state, Bosnian Serbs had the support and help of the Serbian state leadership and Yugoslav People's Army. The goal of the Bosnian Serbs, and larger Serbian state and army, was to secure ethnic Serbian territory in Bosnia. This support and goal ultimately created the entity of Republika Srpska within the Bosnian territory. The same went for Bosnian Croats, as they had the support of Franjo Tudjman and the larger Croatian state. Similarly, the goal of the Croatian state and army was to create a greater Croatia. The geopolitical entity of the Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia within Bosnia was thus created, though never recognized, unlike Republika Srpska. The Serbian state leaned towards viewing Yugoslavia as having a very centralized system, while the Croatian state leaned

towards viewing it as a decentralized federation. This left Bosnia, with Croat and Serb populations, in the middle and on a political “fault line” of sorts. Later, with Croatias and then Bosnia's official successions from Yugoslavia in 1992, the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs were now part of ethnic minorities in a new state rather than the dominant Serb and Croat groups in Yugoslavia. There was a certain “security blanket” of collective identity that was now replaced by ethnic nationalism.

While not discounting the violence against Serbs and Croatians during the leadup to the fall of Yugoslavia, Bosnia in particular found itself victim to ethnicity based persecution. This conflict, ultimately called the Bosnian War, was just one of multiple ethnic conflicts and wars of independence that occurred during the larger period called the Yugoslav Wars from 1991 to 2001. What differs about the Bosnian War is that Bosnia is a multi-ethnic state, having three large ethnic groups living in the same territory. These ethnic groups are Bosnian Muslims (commonly referred to as Bosniaks), Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats. Throughout all of history, J. Andrew Slack points out, Bosnia has found itself “politically peripheral” and caught between powerful political forces and the three dominant ethnic groups have been drawn into the orbit of foreign expansionist political forces/movements. Ibid, 143. The country has essentially been ethnicized from its beginning. This provided Milosevic an easy path to justify war and conquest and hence exploit ethnicity.

Thus, war broke out in April 1992 and for three years they fought themselves to a stalemate with little to no intervention or support by the West. With the large growth of civilian casualties, public pressure grew onto the United States to “do something” to permanently settle the conflict. Ultimately, this led to a one month NATO bombing campaign led by the United States, against the Bosnian Serbs. After a month of bombing, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to come to the table and negotiate a peaceful settlement.

Shaping of the Dayton Accords

There were two options that were on the table: partition along ethnic lines or a weak but multinational Bosnian state. The liberal option was to create a multinational state where ethnicity is not politically salient or a contributor to violence. In other words, Bosnia would have democratic institutions and a centralized government. The other option was partition, which would create mono-ethnic states within the Bosnian territory. Many realists at the time were supportive of partition, in part because of the “ancient hatreds” framework associated with the Balkan region. Though, realists are

much more concerned with power and uncertainty and how that leads to conflict. They are not intrinsically tied to ethnicity like the advocates of ancient hatreds were, but the solutions that realists proposed lined up with those along the ancient hatreds line (i.e. justifying partition). Partition was not a crazy idea in this case, and many have argued that it would have gone over better with the parties on the ground. Partition tends to affirm the role of identity in conflict, and it also acknowledges the role of power; hence, why realists supported it.

During the Dayton negotiations, it was clear that the American delegation (headed by Richard Holbrooke) controlled the environment and agenda. Each party from the region, the Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians, all had their own goals for Dayton. The Croatian delegation, led by President Tudjman, were essentially only concerned with getting a fast withdrawal of Serbian forces from eastern Slavonia. Milosevic, the leader of the Serbs, expressed a new flexibility towards the negotiations but this stemmed from his desire to lift economic and diplomatic sanctions against his country in the wake of the war crimes being committed by Serbia. The Bosnian delegation on the other hand, as Jutta Paczulla writes, did not have a united stance and “presented serious difficulties for the intermediaries.” Paczulla points out that Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic was placed in an awkward position, as nobody on his delegation could agree on priorities, which only heightened his likelihood to avoid decisions. In response to the lack of progress by the Bosnian delegation, the Americans threatened to take away military and economic aid to Bosnia if the negotiations ended in failure.

I argue that the American response to the inconsistency of the Bosnian party during the negotiations did not consider any of the identity dynamics of the region. As I have mentioned prior, Bosnia finds itself different from their neighboring countries like Croatia and Serbia in the sense that it is a multiethnic society, with three large ethnic groups who have been living together and been at odds for years. This naturally would prevent a Bosnian delegation from having a unified response to conflict and peace, since each ethnic group has their own desires and concerns. The fact that the United States wanted Izetbegovic and his negotiating partners to reach an agreement before coming to Dayton, basically meant that the US wanted the Bosnians to solve what Dayton was meant to solve. The American attitude that the Bosnian party posed serious difficulties for the mediators because they couldn't be unified completely glosses over the roots of the conflict they are trying to solve. In American eyes, the Balkans (and specifically Bosnia) are simply “historically chaotic” and they must overcome that chaos before they come to a US-brokered negotiation.

What Went Wrong?

Turning now to the negative arguments against a multinational government, we can see now in retrospect the criticisms that were undoubtedly made at the time. For example, just four years after the signing of the Dayton Accords, Ivo Daalder described the problems that we now know are deeply rooted in the Dayton constitution. Daalder points out that the most important goal of the Dayton Accords has been achieved in the sense that security has been restored both militarily and personally, and physical infrastructure has been reestablished. Unfortunately, the broader goal of Dayton to create a multiethnic, democratic, and economically sustainable country has not been achieved and is unlikely because of the current trajectory of the international community and Bosnia itself. Bosnia's modern economy is one that is almost entirely reliant on foreign aid, and Bosnian politicians have done multiple things to perpetuate that dependence such as not establishing a real banking system and keeping the Yugoslav payment systems. This allows these politicians to "skim off the top" in order to fund nationalist politicians and activities, and these ethnic politics have threatened to warp the privatization process.

A difficult situation has been presented in that if Bosnia were to become a successful multiethnic society, large numbers of refugees would need to return to their homes. Though Daalder argues that Western policy having a basis that given the right circumstances, refugees will return to their homes is becoming increasingly inaccurate. This is because most refugees enjoy better lives outside of their homes, and refugee experts say that each year the probability of a refugee returning home "decreases by ten percent" which tells us that the possibility of creating a multiethnic Bosnian state is dimming by the day. But the broader problem is that if these refugees were to want to return home, jobs need to be created in these areas and to create jobs economic reforms must be adopted. These reforms are impossible without the elimination of corruption and the leaders commitment to control, but in order to do that the nationalist dynamics of politics in Bosnia must end. But the overarching issue is that to denationalize politics, a peaceful multiethnic society has to exist first.

The broader message I am trying to convey is that serious advocates for partition were not taken seriously. This raises the question of, why did the US seem to almost instinctively go for the liberal solution? My answer lies in the United States projection of its own values onto a very uncertain situation and conflict.

Dayton as a Liberal Projection

Within the United States, expert and public opinion was quite divided although the majority seemed to be opposed to partition. As mentioned prior, in the US the liberal policy of a multinational state where ethnicity essentially doesn't matter was more popular. The American 19th century ideal of a "melting pot" is an extreme version of this liberal thinking; as in ideals that deemphasize ethnicity and national backgrounds. In the end, what might be called a weak liberal strategy was done by preserving the recognition of Bosnia as a sovereign state, calling for the return of refugees, restoring economic ties, and human rights protections within Bosnia. Though on the flip side, this was weak because of the recognition and establishment of territorial division (basically de facto partition) and the legitimization of separate armies and lines of segregation between them. Essentially, the Dayton Accords are both a plan for reunification and a plan for partition; two policies that are contradictory to each other.

The American involvement in this conflict aimed at de-intensifying the hostilities among the people of Bosnia. This goal has been common for Western intervention as a whole throughout history and modern times. Especially when it comes to post-conflict societies, the United States and its Western allies want to overcome and transcend "self versus other" narratives and dialectics, as Faris Kocan points out. Though, as Kocan writes, this is not always feasible because many ethnic conflicts usually occur between more secure "majority collectives" and less secure minority ethnic groups. In the Bosnian conflict, the American intervention was ethnicized in the sense that it generated and perpetuated "ontological asymmetry" between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs. It is important to understand that not all collectives in post conflict societies are capable of having a stable conception of the Self because of their asymmetrical position in the state they exist in. This is significant to note in ethnic conflicts because certain identity narratives often can go unnoticed in the processes of trying to de-intensify hostilities.

The American president at the time of the Dayton Accords was Bill Clinton, who defeated the incumbent George H. W. Bush in 1992. Clinton was criticized by Bush on the campaign trail for his liberal policies, but these policies were ultimately what led Clinton to win the presidency. Hence, it would make sense that Clinton would possess a liberal attitude towards Dayton and the Bosnian conflict as a whole. Unfortunately, as I have pointed out prior, the Dayton Accords were not entirely successful because a liberal stance was used to solve an identity conflict.

Warren Bass suggests that the Dayton Accords did not represent the vindication of the policies Bill Clinton defeated Bush on, but rather the reality of the realpolitik that kept the Bush administration out of Bosnia in the years before. The accords themselves were an “epitaph for Bosnia as a multiethnic state,” and the better services of the accords have still yet to be implemented. The negotiating of the accords required working with and ultimately strengthening the two regional dictators in Croatia and Serbia, Milosevic of Serbia and Tudjman of Croatia. These two leaders were ethnic nationalists and their policies were contrary to Clinton’s liberal beliefs/values. Bass argues that the result of the Dayton Accords would not invoke such disappointment if the American administration at the time would have stuck to its “Wilsonian guns.” The actions by Clinton’s administration unfortunately have come to resemble those of a Republican administration, similar to Richard Nixon’s. It is also the case that the strategy that Richard Holbrooke and Milosevic took in negotiating the accords has an underlying problem. The Bosnian Serbs have “still not reconciled to Dayton” years later, Bass writes, and Dayton is viewed as an imposed settlement to them and combines reconciliation with exclusion. This result further proves that America projected its own liberal ideals onto a conflict that was deeply rooted in ethnic grievances and hostilities. Therefore, had identity dynamics been taken into consideration during negotiation, the results may have turned out better for both Bosnia and for America's reputation as a liberal country.

Conclusion

In closing, we see in Bosnia today the lasting impact and negative effects of the Dayton constitution. These problems include a reliance on foreign aid, as well as the presence of heavily nationalist politics. In this paper, I have attributed these problems to the lack of attention and focus by the United States on identity and regional dynamics during the Bosnian War. I argue that the United States constructed Bosnia, and the broader Balkan region, as historically chaotic and thus projected a savior complex and liberal solution onto the region. Going forward, a lesson of Dayton is to understand that lasting peace requires attention to identity dynamics and the causes of conflict.

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Amelia Cochran



Giorgia Fiorani



Mariana Byker

After completing my courses in the INT department this spring, I will be attending DePaul Law School in the fall and working towards my JD. I am a part of the BA/JD program so I will not be formally graduating undergraduate until 2024, following my 1L year. I have been working at the law firm Hanley Flight & Zimmerman in downtown Chicago and will continue my work there until I begin law school.

After graduation, I will be interning with the SITE program in the Lombardy region of Italy. As an intern in this program I will be working as an assistant teacher at a school for international relations. I'm excited for the opportunity to live and work in Italy as Italian was my minor at DePaul. After completing the internship I am hoping to attend grad school! I'm so grateful to the INT program for preparing me well for my future endeavors as well as for the opportunity to serve as one of the student representatives this year.

First, thank you to the INT department. I wouldn't trade my education from the professors here for anything. Second, I am excited to graduate-- the first of four siblings to do so. Post-graduation, like right after it's all said and done, I'm planning a trip to see some friends in Europe and Asia. With school and work, it's become long overdue to spend time with loved ones-- especially somewhere on a beach. After that, I'm thinking about doing an excursion in the southern states, which I suspect will turn my focus toward photography again. However, the big picture for me is law school. This summer will be packed with studying for the LSAT and preparing my resume for the fall application cycle. My only other plans post-graduation are to expand my urban farming capabilities (thank you to Dr. Stump and Dr. Gott for sparking this passion), keep up with the important conversations happening in our world, and to spend time with my dog. As we all know, they say you can't teach an old dog new tricks-- we'll see about that.

WHERE ARE THEY HEADED?

CHECK OUT THE POST-GRADUATE PLANS OF THIS YEARS INT DEPARTMENT STUDENT WORKERS!

International Studies Department Open Positions

The International Studies Department searches for new junior and senior student representatives and a department student tutor for each new academic year. If you are interested, contact the Department Assistant of International Studies, Sheila Sullivan, at **SSULLI24@depaul.edu** with your notice of interest!

STUDENT REP RESPONSIBILITIES

- Coordinate and participate in program-sponsored events (e.g., weekly INTuesday events)
- Post content on social media related to INT events, news, and opportunities
- Assist with the quarterly student newsletter, *INTerrupted Silence*
- Attend 1-hour weekly front office meetings and monthly department meeting
- Brainstorm initiatives and events to promote student engagement and knowledge

Eligibility Requirements:

- Must be a rising INT junior or senior
- Provide your name, email address, and paragraph description of yourself and what you'd like to achieve in this role

INT TUTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

- Assist students with academic inquiries, confusions, and questions
- Provide career planning advice and act as a mentor to INT students
- Utilize active learning models to encourage student academic success and motivation
- Attend 1-hour weekly front office meetings and monthly department meeting
- Conduct student outreach initiatives to notify students of department resources

Eligibility Requirements:

- Must be a rising INT senior
- Provide your name, email address, and paragraph description of yourself and what you'd like to achieve in this role